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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




) Civil Action 




Defend ant . ) 
No . 84-3040 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT ON RELIEF 
1. Plaint i f f Ann Hopkins' departure from Price Waterhouse 
in January 1984 was a constructive discharge. [Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reversed 
on other i ssue, 109 s.ct. 1775 (1989).J 
2. Plaintiff sti ll wishes to be a partner at Price 
Waterhouse. She testified that "[m]anagement consulting is my 
profession and Price Waterhouse is preeminent in my practice 
area." Her specialty, the design and implementation of large 
scale computer-based information systems, has become the most 
significant part o f defendant's consulting practice in recent 
years. (Tr. 7-10, 69-75, 243.J 
3. Defendant has not shown that plaintiff would be unable 
to function productively as a partner at Price Waterhouse. It 
may be that some partners would not favor plaintiff's membership 
in the firm, but defendant has not shown or even tried to show 
that any partner would be unwilling or unable to work with 
plaintiff on a professional level, should the need arise. In 
addition, a number of partners supported plaintiff's candidacy 
.. 
originally, and other friends of plaintiff have become partners 
in recent years. (Tr. 9, 249-50.) 
4. Price Waterhouse admits partners on July 1 of each year, 
which is the beginning of the firm's fiscal year. If plaintiff's 
original candidacy had been successful, she would have been 
admitted to partnership on July 1, 1983. If she is offered 
admission as of July 1, 1990, she is due the difference between 
what she has actually earned during this period and what she 
would have earned as a Price Waterhouse partner, plus interest. 
According to Dr. Joseph Tryon, an economist specializing in 
actuarial projections, plaintiff's loss during this period, 
including interest, is $682,481. Defendant has not seriously 
challenged these calculations, and the Court accepts this figure. 
[Pl.Ex. A3, A4, A6, Al4, Al5; Tr. 110-11.] 
5. Since the parties have stipulated what an average 
partner in the class of 1983 has earned since that time, as well 
as what plaintiff actually earned, plaintiff is entitled to the 
back compensation reflected in Finding No. 4 because defendant 
has not proved that she did not adequately mitigate her losses. 
[Pl.Ex. A14-A15.) 
(a) Upon leaving Price Waterhouse in January 1984, plaintiff 
established .her own consulting firm, which she later incorporated 
as The Hopkins Company, Inc. She continued with her own business 
until mid-1987, when changes in her personal life (i.e., 
separation from her husband) caused her to seek a position that 
was more stable in terms of both hours and cash flow. At that 
point, she began to pursue full-time employment with the World 
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Bank, one of her consulting clients. She became a Bank employee 
in September 1988 and is now earning approximately $92,500 
annually. [Tr. 12-14, 56.J 
(b) Plaintiff's decision to start her own business was not 
unreasonable. Establishing a business is one of the principal 
avenues followed by those leaving Price Waterhouse, as the 
official who maintains the firm's personnel records (Mr. Smith) 
and its consultant on executive placement (Mr. Redford) both 
testified. When plaintiff left Price Waterhouse, she and her 
husband (a former consulting partner at Touche Ross who had left 
to enter the real estate business) assessed her skills, 
experience, expertise and contacts, and they concluded that "in 
terms of developing equity over a period of time, in terms of 
earning a good salary, in terms of pursuing [her) profession with 
the kind of professional freedom and interest that [she] always 
had," her best option was to start her own business. [Tr. 15,78-
80, 95, 217-18, 300.J 
(c) Defendant did not prove that plaintiff could have 
secured a job that would have paid as much as she would have 
earned as a partner at Price Waterhouse. First, there is no 
evidence that a consultant such as plaintiff could have 
approached her earnings potential as a Price Waterhouse partner 
anywhere except as a partner at another "Big 8" (now "Big 6") 
accounting firm. Moreover, it appears that new partners at some 
of those firms earn significantly less than Price Waterhouse 
partners, and senior employees in many cases earned less during 
the last few years than plaintiff did, first as a self-employed 
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consultant and later as a World Bank employee. Second, defendant 
has not identified any Big 8 firm that was willing to accept 
plaintiff as a partner after she left Price Waterhouse, or 
willing even to accept her as a manager with an assurance that 
she would likely become a partner in the future. In this regard, 
it is significant that defendant called as witnesses individuals 
affiliated with four of the other five "Big 6" firms (Messrs. 
Beach, Gray, Grimm, Wren), and none testified that plaintiff 
could have become a partner with their firms (or their 
predecessors in the Big 8). Further, the generalized testimony 
of Mr. Meder and Dr. Andrisani, such as Dr. Andrisani's statement 
that he found it "extremely difficult. to believe that Price 
Waterhouse would have been the only fish in the sea," does not 
begin to carry defendant's burden of proving insufficient 
mitigation. Dr. Andrisani admitted that he could not identify 
any firms prepared to extend an offer to plaintiff; nor could Mr. 
Meder. [Pl.Ex. Al5; Tr. 185-86, 195, 200-01, 205, 302, 351-54.] 
(d) It is highly unlikely that plaintiff could have become a 
partner in another Big 8 firm. Price Waterhouse itself has never 
admitted as a partner someone who was rejected for partnership by 
another Big 8 firm. Moreover, defendant surveyed all senior 
professionals who left its employ in the period 1980-1987 and 
could identify only 4 who had been rejected for partnership at 
Price Waterhouse and who subsequently became partners at other 
Big 8 firms. During that period, more than 100 candidates had 
been rejected for partnership by defendant. Thus only 4 of 100 
or more rejected Price Waterhouse candidates made partner 
-4-
elsewhere. These odds were even longer for plaintiff, since her 
lawsuit against defendant had received some publicity, and Mr. 
Redford -- defendant's executive placement specialist -- candidly 
acknowledged that he counsels job seekers to try to avoid 
mentioning any litigation against their former employers and even 
to dissemble about it. [Pl.Ex. Al; Tr. 314-15, 261-63, 354-56.] 
(e) Although plaintiff concentrated on setting up her own 
business after leaving Price Waterhouse, she also pursued other 
possibilities, including speaking with partners at Touche Ross, 
speaking with the owners or officials of consulting firms not 
part of the Big 8, submitting her resume to search firms, and 
following advertisements in a number of newspapers. Her search 
focused on Washington, D.C. but was not limited to this area. 
Plaintiff did not receive any offers comparable to partnership at 
Price Waterhouse. Possibly an executive placement firm such as 
Mr. Redford's might have advised her to do other things. Price 
Waterhouse had not retained such a placement firm in 1984 when 
plaintiff left, however, and Redford admitted that individuals 
ordinarily cannot secure the services of a firm like his unless 
the firm has been retained by their former employer. In any 
event, plaintiff's job search efforts were secondary to the 
creation of her own business, and defendant has not shown that her 
decision to start her own business was unreasonable. (Tr. 17-25, 
311.] 
6. Alternative Finding on Front Pay. 
If the Court declines to order defendant to invite plaintiff 
to become a partner, she will be entitled to front pay. In this 
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circumstance, the amount of back pay due is $554,728 (through 
June 30, 1989), and the front pay due is between $2,350,353 and 
$2,811,296 (July 1, 1989 through 2025, plaintiff's life 
expectancy). The higher front pay figure assumes that 
defendant's growth will be consistent with that of the economy as 
a whole, while the lower figure assumes that the growth will be 
consistent wi th the firm's own history since 1971. Dr. Tryon 
testified as to these back and front pay figures, which the Court 
accepts. His methodology and calculations were not seriously 
challenged by defendant. [Pl.Ex. A3, A4, Al0; Tr. 128.] 
(a) Dr. Andrisani's principal attack on Dr. Tryon's figures 
resulted from Andrisani's assertion that plaintiff could have 
gone elsewhere and earned what she would have earned as a partner 
at Price Waterhouse. As found above, however, defendant did not 
prove that plaintiff could have secured a position elsewhere with 
pay comparable to that of a partner at Price Waterhouse. 
[Findings 5(c) (d); Tr. 324, 349-50.] 
(b) Dr. Andrisani also criticized Dr. Tryon for assuming 
that defendant's future growth would at a minimum be consistent 
with the firm's growth since 1971. Dr. Tryon explained, however, 
why his approach was reasonable "unless there is some actual 
prospect that something dire is going to happen to Price 
Waterhouse." Defendant did not show any such prospect. on the 
contrary, the firm now admits more partners annually than it did 
when this litigation began, something which is inconsistent with 
"hunkering down" to survive a perceived difficult period. [Tr. 
128, 173, 264.] 
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(c) Dr. Andrisani criticized Dr. Tryon for assuming that 
plaintiff would have stayed with Price Waterhouse until she 
reached the firm's normal retirement age of 60 in 2004. 
Attrition occurs among partners at the firm, but much of it is 
related to those who are not performing as well as expected. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiff would 
not perform well, as Dr. Andrisani acknowledged. Moreover, 
plaintiff is less likely than most partners to leave, since her 
career ambition to become a Price Waterhouse partner has been 
delayed by a number of years. [Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 
F.2d at 472; Tr. 358-59.J 
(d) Dr. Andrisani criticized Dr. Tryon's assumption that 
plaintiff would select a flexible retirement plan upon retiring, 
instead of the considerably less remunerative fixed plan. Dr. 
Tryon's assumption was reasonable. The fixed plan is intended 
for retiring partners going on to second careers, and only 25 of 
200 retiring partners have elected it. There is no reason to 
believe that plaintiff would do so. [Tr. 244.] 
(e) Dr. Andrisani's criticisms of the interest rates used by 
Dr. Tryon are quibbles that have not been shown to affect the 
basic integrity of Tryon's figures. Defendant has not 
persuasively offered any alternative figures. [Tr. 338-42.J 
7. Based on Findings 1-5, the Court finds that there is no 
reason to believe that plaintiff cannot function effectively as a 
partner at Price Waterhouse and that, should she be admitted to 
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the partnership effective July 1, 1990, she will be due $682,481 
in back compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
1275 K Street, N.W. 
Suite 950 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 898-4800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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